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TIME, INSTITUTIONS, AND ADJUDICATION 
GARY S. LAWSON* 
Some of my earliest and fondest memories regarding constitutional theory 
involve Mike McConnell. He was a participant at the very first Federalist 
Society conference in 1982, at a time when the entire universe of conservative 
constitutional theorists fit comfortably in the front of one classroom. More 
importantly, at another Federalist Society conference in 1987, he gave a speech 
on constitutional interpretation that, unbeknownst to him, profoundly shaped 
my entire intellectual approach to the field by emphasizing the obvious but oft-
overlooked point that different kinds of documents call for different kinds of 
interpretative methods.1 In 2015, it is more than an honor and a pleasure to be 
able to comment on Time, Institutions, and Interpretation,2 Professor 
McConnell’s Distinguished Lecture at Boston University School of Law. 
There are, in fact, many continuities between that 1987 speech (of which I 
still have remarkably vivid memories) and Professor McConnell’s elegant 
2015 exposition of the roles of time and institutional roles in constitutional 
theory. In his present Lecture, Professor McConnell sets out a five-factor 
framework across three dimensions of time—the founding, the in-between, and 
the present—and two sets of institutions—relatively democratic legislatures, 
executives, and state courts on the one hand and relatively insulated federal 
courts on the other3—both to describe constitutional theory and to prescribe a 
consistent and coherent methodology for constitutional decisionmaking. 
Assembling those five factors into their various combinations yields an 
admirably comprehensive picture of the landscape of constitutional theory: 
Originalism looks to the understandings of democratically accountable 
institutions . . . when the constitutional provision was adopted. 
Longstanding practice looks to the understandings of democratically 
 
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
1 Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359 (1988). 
Needless to say, Professor McConnell bears no responsibility for, and indeed may be utterly 
appalled by, what I have done with that inspiration in the ensuing three decades. 
2 Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745 
(2015). 
3 See id. at 1746-47. 
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accountable institutions . . . over time. Judicial restraint, by which I mean 
the disposition to defer to the decisions of elected bodies when 
constitutional principles are not clearly to the contrary, looks to the 
understandings of politically accountable institutions in the present. 
Precedent looks to the understandings of life-tenured courts over time. 
The normative approach looks to the understandings of life-tenured courts 
in the present.4 
The Lecture packs an enormous amount of both material and sophistication 
into a compact presentation, and I am envious of Professor McConnell’s talent 
for parsimony. I will accordingly try to confine myself here to a few short 
observations about his thoughtful scheme and its implications. I will offer one 
observation about his descriptive project, one comment on his prescriptive 
project, and one friendly (I hope) amendment. 
As a descriptive matter, Professor McConnell thinks that virtually all 
theorists share some common ground: “Almost all interpreters, whatever their 
school of thought, agree that the constitutional text . . . is the place to begin, 
and that when it is clear it is binding.”5 This assumption gives rise to a number 
of complications that Professor McConnell does not have space in this format 
to address but which are critical to an assessment of his descriptive project 
(and, I believe, his prescriptive project as well). 
The most important complication concerns what it means for a 
constitutional text to be “clear.” That is not, by any understanding of the term, 
itself clear. The clarity of any textual provision is a function of (1) what you 
think counts toward a correct textual answer (principles of admissibility), (2) 
how heavily those various considerations count (principles of significance or 
weight), (3) how much of that evidence is required in order to pass the relevant 
threshold of clarity (the standard of proof), (4) the presumptive baseline from 
which clear meaning is required in order to move in any direction (the burden 
of proof), and (5) how complete an evidence set one has and is willing to 
assemble.6 At least some of those elements, most notably the standard of proof 
and the boundaries of the evidence set, fall outside the traditional purview of 
what Professor McConnell describes as constitutional theory, but they likely 
dictate the application of Professor McConnell’s framework in any instance. Is 
textual meaning “clear” only if no reasonable person could advance a contrary 
interpretation with a straight face? Only if an interpretation is immune from 
even Cartesian-style doubts? Or does clarity require some lesser degree of 
certainty? If the standard for certainty is high enough, virtually nothing in the 
Constitution is textually “clear,” and if it is low enough (something on the 
order of “better than available alternatives”), virtually everything in the 
 
4 Id. at 1748. 
5 Id. at 1747. 
6 For detailed examination of this structure of proof in the context of legal claims, 
including but not limited to claims about constitutional meaning, see GARY LAWSON, 
EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (forthcoming 2016). 
  
2015] TIME, INSTITUTIONS, AND ADJUDICATION 1795 
 
Constitution is “clear.” The hidden battleground in constitutional interpretation 
is often the standard of proof, which typically operates beneath the surface. If 
Professor McConnell wants to make clarity a central feature of his framework, 
that hidden battleground needs to be brought to the fore. Similarly, whether 
something is “clear” or “unclear” may depend on what universe of materials 
one examines; clarity, as with any other judgment, is always a function of the 
evidence set that forms the basis for the judgment. People looking at different 
bodies of evidence, just as people who are applying different standards of 
proof, may have very different ideas about what is clear or not clear, and they 
may have very different ideas about what constitutes an adequate evidence set. 
Thus, even if people profess agreement about the role of “clear textual 
meaning,” they may have very different referents for that term. Professor 
McConnell may too quickly pass over the quite complex problem of giving an 
account of clarity in constitutional interpretation, and that is important given 
that clarity is one of the linchpins of his framework. 
A second complication concerns the degree to which Professor McConnell 
accurately describes the landscape of constitutional theory when he suggests 
agreement about the controlling character of clear text (assuming, in can-
opener fashion, agreement about what it means for text to be clear). There is no 
way to rigorously test this hypothesis, but I posit that agreement on that point 
is much thinner than Professor McConnell evidently believes. 
There is a potentially quite large zone in which clear text will, as a matter of 
practice, control only when (1) there is very little at stake and/or (2) people 
think that ignoring the text will do more harm than good to their political 
agendas. If the stakes are high enough, both (2) and the constitutional text will 
disappear from the scene. Take the seemingly straightforward case of the 
thirty-five-year-old president.7 Does anyone seriously doubt that if a far-left 
president succeeds in packing the Supreme Court with far-left social justice 
warriors, and the far-left agenda is thought to depend on a thirty-three-year-old 
president, a majority could be found to “modernize” the principles in the clause 
to take account of longer life spans?8 Or that an equal protection, or due 
process, or sweet-mysteries-of-life, principle could be found to override or 
amend even an apparently unamendable Senate Clause if it gets too much in 
the way? Are those prospects really any more bizarre than any of dozens of 
text-eviscerating moves that have already taken place—including some in 
which the stakes were sufficiently low to make the obliteration of text seem 
 
7 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 1747. 
8 Could something equivalent happen on the far right? I suppose it is possible (remember 
that Robert Bork was prepared to write off the Ninth Amendment as an ink blot), but I think 
it is less likely—if only because the Constitution is more inhospitable to the present agenda 
of the left. The Constitution hardly enacts the agenda of the twenty-first century far right, 
but especially on the large issues of federal power, the Constitution could serve as a pretty 
fair manifesto for the Tea Party. But readers are certainly invited to consider their own 
examples on any side of any spectrum to illustrate the general point that I am making. 
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almost pathological? In a world of Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell9 
(annihilating the text of the Contracts Clause), United States v. Ptasynski10 
(destroying the text of the Uniformity Clause), and Tashjian v. Republican 
Party of Connecticut11 (laying utter waste to the text of the Qualifications 
Clause), it is hard to imagine anything that is really off limits. Parchment 
barriers, as the founding generation knew quite well, are about as firm as the 
2015 Seattle Seahawks offensive line.12 
In short, the premise that clear text governs may not, as a descriptive matter, 
carry nearly as much load as Professor McConnell imagines. And any 
normative argument for why clear text ought to govern must, as with any 
normative argument on any subject, be grounded in a foundationally sound 
moral theory rather than anything distinctively legal or interpretative. 
Interpretation can tell you what a text means. It cannot tell you what to do with 
that meaning once you have it—or even whether obtaining that meaning is 
worth the effort. 
From a prescriptive standpoint, the real key to Professor McConnell’s 
Lecture is his program for integrating the various methodologies (or 
modalities) in his five-factor framework into a cohesive approach to 
adjudication. Professor McConnell has concluded that “it is unlikely in 
theory—and impossible in practice—to employ only one methodology.”13 No 
methodology “will necessarily produce a single right answer to the disputed 
legal question,”14 but instead any single methodology will likely “produce a 
range of plausible answers.”15 Thus, he opines, “the most important and 
neglected task of constitutional theory is to prioritize the methodologies in a 
way that can be consistently applied in the real work of constitutional 
adjudication.”16 Specifically, one needs to sort out the respective roles of 
precedent, practice, and judicial restraint or normativity in deciding cases when 
text does not provide the “clear” answer. Professor McConnell’s solution is to 
have the various methodologies work “as a series of successive filters.”17 One 
starts with text, then moves to original meaning if necessary, then goes to 
precedent and practice (or “liquidation”) if necessary, and then, if no answer 
emerges, “[e]ither the court will follow the logic of judicial restraint, and will 
 
9 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
10 462 U.S. 74 (1983). 
11 479 U.S. 208 (1986). 
12 These words were written after the tenth game of the 2015 season, at which point the 
most elusive quarterback in two generations has been sacked thirty-five times. Seattle 
Seahawks Statistics—Team and Player Stats, ESPN (Nov. 23, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/ 
team/stats/_/name/sea [http://perma.cc/9Y4B-7ZV3]. 
13 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1786 . 
14 Id. at 1787. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 1785. 
17 Id. at 1787. 
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hold that the action under review is constitutional, or it will follow the 
normative approach and choose the interpretation that seems best for the 
nation.”18 In any event: 
The important point here is the sequencing. If text is clear, there is no 
need to look beyond it. Where the original meaning of the text is clear, 
there is no need to consult practice and precedent, let alone judicial 
restraint or normativity. If the original meaning of the text is not clear, but 
practice and precedent have produced an answer, that is the answer the 
court should follow. It is wrong to jump from any ambiguity in the text 
immediately to normativity because this short-circuits the democratic 
process built into practice and precedent.19 
Assume for the moment that one can secure agreement that clear text, 
however “clear” is ultimately defined in this context, is controlling. What 
accounts for the sequencing of methodologies after that point? Why is 
precedent or practice higher on the scale than, say, restraint or normativity? It 
cannot be because precedent and practice are sources of actual meaning, 
because they are not—they are decision tools employed apart from, or perhaps 
even in opposition to, actual meaning. And once one has exhausted meaning, 
the assumed agreement about the hierarchical role of meaning is also 
exhausted. If agreement does not fix the rest of the sequencing, there must be 
some reason for choosing one sequence over another. I do not believe that 
Professor McConnell has provided a strong argument for choosing his 
sequence over others—such as going straight to normativity once a clear 
answer is unavailable. Professor McConnell is, in essence, re-creating the now-
famous (or now-infamous) “construction zone” of the new originalism, which 
takes over where interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning comes to an 
end.20 By definition, interpretation does not help much with construction, 
because construction only comes into play when interpretation gives out. Any 
argument for a particular construction—and Professor McConnell’s preferred 
sequencing is a construction—must be grounded in foundationally sound moral 
arguments. Professor McConnell’s construction certainly does not fare worse 
than others that I have seen, but I am not sure that it fares better. 
To be sure, perhaps Professor McConnell’s point is only to highlight the 
need for some consistent and coherent sequence rather than to establish one 
sequence as uniquely correct. But I think he is making a stronger point than 
that, and I am not sure that he has successfully made it. 
With that in mind, I want to offer what I think is a friendly amendment to 
Professor McConnell’s framework that might do at least some of the necessary 
work. 
 
18 Id. at 1788. 
19 Id. 
20 See Gary Lawson, Classical Liberal Constitution or Classical Liberal Construction?, 
8 N.Y.U.  J.L. & LIBERTY 808, 814-16 (2014). 
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Professor McConnell is concerned with theories of adjudication rather than 
with theories of interpretation. That was true in 198721 and it is true today. He 
is not analyzing constitutional meaning. He is analyzing constitutional 
decisionmaking. The question that Professor McConnell claims, in his opening 
paragraph, to address is: “what methodology should courts, and especially the 
Supreme Court, employ when interpreting the constitutional text in disputed 
cases?”22 That, however, is not quite the question that he actually addresses. 
The more precise formulation of the question would be: “[W]hat methodology 
should courts, and especially the Supreme Court, employ when deciding 
disputed constitutional cases?” Those are not the same two questions. They are 
the same if, but only if, one believes that cases should be decided solely on the 
basis of constitutional meaning. But almost no one in the modern world 
actually believes that. As Professor McConnell observes on several occasions, 
almost everyone gives some kind of weight to precedent, practice, 
consequences, or some kind of normative commitment (whether to democracy, 
the rule of law, a limited judicial role, the platform of the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party, or anything else is beside the point), all of which are 
considerations other than and apart from constitutional meaning. The 
“constitutional theory” that is the subject of Professor McConnell’s attention is 
not, strictly speaking, theory regarding constitutional meaning. It is theory 
regarding constitutional action. 
That focus opens the door to a potential tweak to the framework that to 
some extent brings together the conceptually quite different worlds of 
interpretation and adjudication. “The big question,” says Professor McConnell, 
“is what to do when ‘fit’ runs out.”23 That is, what does one do when all 
sources of meaning have been exhausted and no clear answer emerges? At that 
point, the conventional view says that one must choose between “judicial 
restraint” and “the normative approach”—which, in terms of time and 
institutions, means choosing between “the current view of the political 
institutions with authority over the matter . . . [and] the current view of the 
judiciary.”24 If one gets to that point, Professor McConnell says to choose 
judicial restraint: 
Constitutional cases always begin with a governmental act—a statute, an 
executive action, or a common law decision. If the judge doesn’t “know 
what the right answer” is, there is no need to grab inapt tools to form an 
answer. The judge can always say: “[T]here is no legal basis for finding 
the government action unconstitutional, whatever I might think of it as a 
matter of policy.” For that reason, I think Posner is wrong to assume that 
the normative approach is inescapable in constitutional cases.25 
 
21 See McConnell, supra note 1, at 359-60. 
22 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1745. 
23 Id. at 1776. 
24 Id. at 1777. 
25 Id. at 1785. 
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From a purely interpretative standpoint, Professor McConnell is partly right. 
By “[f]rom an interpretative standpoint,” I mean that if one accepts the 
premise that clear constitutional meaning is controlling when it is available 
(and I am not assuming that anyone must or should accept that premise but am 
simply taking it as a foundational principle of Professor McConnell’s project), 
that meaning provides an answer to the adjudicative puzzle that Professor 
McConnell is trying to solve. Let us assume that we have exhausted all 
legitimate sources of meaning when trying to answer a constitutional question. 
(This assumes away all of the myriad questions concerning how one ascertains 
constitutional meaning; for instance, some people might consider precedent 
and practice significant sources of meaning while others generally would not, 
people might disagree on the appropriate standard of proof for claims about 
meaning, and people might construct evidence sets very differently.) Before 
resorting either to restraint or normativity as a decision tool, perhaps one first 
should ask whether the Constitution itself prescribes a decision mechanism for 
resolving interpretative uncertainty. 
To be sure, there is no “Uncertainty Clause” in the Constitution. But that 
does not mean that the Constitution does not contain its own prescribed 
answer, in some subtler form, for resolving uncertainty. (Again, we are 
assuming that constitutional meaning controls when it is available.) Professor 
McConnell actually has the answer before him in discussing Richard Posner’s 
argument that judges “when faced with a case that is indeterminate from the 
standpoint of conventional legal reasoning . . . cannot throw up their hands and 
say, ‘I can’t decide this case because I don’t know what the right answer to the 
question presented by it is.’”26 Professor McConnell, as we have already seen, 
points out that judges in constitutional cases can simply note the fact that they 
are being called upon to overturn a decision of a political actor and leave that 
prior decision alone absent an affirmative reason in the constitutional text to 
act.27 In other words, Professor McConnell notes that judges can decide cases 
without definitively pronouncing interpretations by reference to burden-of-
proof principles. Inertia counsels against judicial action until some affirmative 
legal reason impels motion, and if a legal reason in a constitutional context 
requires clear meaning, the absence of clear meaning leads to inaction. In other 
words, Judge Posner is just flat-out wrong: judges really can throw up their 
hands in the face of uncertainty, provided only that some party bears the 
burden of proof. As long as the burden of proof is allocated, decisions can 
always be made, without resort to judicial lawmaking, even in the face of the 
most radical interpretative uncertainty. 
I have elsewhere spelled out how this principle applies to constitutional 
adjudication as a matter of constitutional meaning.28 It yields something very 
 
26 Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
519, 539 (2012). 
27 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 1785. 
28 See generally Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV.   J.L. 
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much like Professor McConnell’s restraint principle when (most) actions of 
state governments are challenged on federal constitutional grounds. That is 
because state governments do not get their powers from the Federal 
Constitution (except in a few cases involving federal elections, federal 
constitutional amendments, and the like). Anyone challenging a state act as 
violative of the Federal Constitution is thus advancing an affirmative claim 
about the law, in the face of legal inertia in favor of the state action. In those 
contexts, Professor McConnell’s principle of restraint is interpretatively 
derivable as a matter of constitutional meaning. On the other hand, when 
federal action is at stake, the principle of enumerated federal power means that 
the force of inertia operates against exercises of federal power, so that there 
must be an affirmative showing of a grant of federal power in order to validate 
federal action. In those contexts, there is no room for a principle of restraint. 
The legal baseline is absence of federal power until an affirmative 
demonstration of such power has been made. Once that demonstration is made, 
the burden of proof shifts to the challenger of the government action. If, for 
example, one can find an authorization for federal action, such as the 
commerce power, but it is claimed to violate an affirmative constraint on that 
otherwise general authorization, such as the Ex Post Facto Clause or the 
Second Amendment, the force of inertia works in favor of the federal action 
and it can be overturned only in the face of clear meaning. 
Thus, I would propose a modest alteration to Professor McConnell’s 
preferred sequencing of methodologies. One needs only one methodology— 
original meaning—and one normative assumption—that cases should be 
decided on the basis of original meaning. Once one has ascertained original 
meaning, there is either a clear answer or there is not. If there is no clear 
answer, the original meaning tells you how to decide the case: rule against 
whichever party bears the burden of proof on the relevant legal proposition. 
Sometimes that will be the government and sometimes that will be the 
challenger, depending on what government entity is involved and the precise 
nature of the claim at issue. Methodologies such as precedent or practice enter 
the picture only if they can be justified as valid sources of original meaning. 
In short, Professor McConnell’s framework is, with some very modest 
qualifications, an apt description of much of modern constitutional theory and 
an illuminating vehicle for exploring fundamental questions of both 




& PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996); Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225 
(2012). 
